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17 March 1962

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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
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## DAILY BRIEF



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\*USSR: The moderate tone of Khrushchev's remarks on Berlin and Germany in his 16 March speech--his first major foreign policy pronouncement since the party congress last October--was intended to hold the door open for a negotiated settlement. He again indicated willingness to work out an agreement with the West on the status of West Berlin and Allied access which would be incorporated in a separate peace treaty with East Germany. He also reiterated that there is no "fatal deadline" for the conclusion of such a treaty. Khrushchev sought to convey an impression of restraint by declining to comment on the current US-Soviet exchanges on these questions, but attempted to heighten the sense of urgency in the West by implying that Soviet patience is nearing an end. He emphasized that a Berlin settlement must include not only guarantees for Allied access but also "recognition and respect for the sovereign rights of the GDR."

Khrushchev again warned that the USSR would respond to US nuclear testing in the atmosphere by "staging its own tests,"

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and contended that Soviet tests would preclude any possibility that the US might achieve a "military advantage." He made it clear that the USSR will continue to reject Western proposals for controls over a test ban agreement and will insist that national detection systems provide a "sound foundation" for an agreement. He claimed that the Soviet underground nuclear explosion, announced by the US Atomic Energy Commission on 2 February, was staged deliberately to disprove the West's contention that it is impossible to detect some underground tests.

In criticizing the West's attitude toward disarmament, Khrushchev asserted that the Western leaders overlook their own vulnerability in a war under modern conditions which should incline them to take a more favorable view of Soviet disarmament proposals. He sought to point up this alleged vulnerability by claiming that the USSR has developed a "global rocket" which cannot be detected and is invulnerable to "anti-missile weapons."

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France-Algeria: The director of De Gaulle's personal cabinet told a US Embassy officer on 15 March that although the Evian negotiations had dragged out much longer than expected, he did not think they would be extended "over another weekend."

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A high French official and a rebel spokesman have confirmed that the expected signing of a cease-fire accord on 15 March was delayed by disagreement over a French proposal for the disposition of the rebel army following a cease-fire. The French Government is taking extensive measures, both in Algeria and metropolitan France, to control the violence

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the Secret Army Organization is expected to provoke following announcement of a cease-fire

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\*Israel-Syria: Israeli air force planes bombed Syrian artillery positions east of Lake Tiberias on 17 March following an artillery duel and an infantry attack by tank-supported Israeli units in the same area. The UN Mixed Armistice Commission negotiated a cease-fire which became effective at 0700 local time (2400 EST). The clash resulted from a series of incidents--on 8, 15, and 16 March--involving Syrian artillery and Israeli patrol boats which, according to the Israelis, were escorting Israeli fishermen on Lake Tiberias.

The fighting reflects the sensitivity on both sides regarding Israel's long-range plan to pump Jordan River waters out of Lake Tiberias, as well as the more immediate issues which precipitated the latest incidents. [The Syrians have said they would attack Israel if the diversion project is implemented. The actual diversion is not scheduled to begin until late 1963, but Syrian units in the border area recently had been put on the highest degree of alert and families and dependents of Syrian troops were being evacuated in anticipation of a possible early clash over the dispute. The subsequent Israeli land and air attacks may lead to additional and possibly more serious incidents despite the cease-fire that has been arranged]

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Mongolia: Ulan Bator has recently made several moves which underline the Mongolian leaders' strong commitment to the Soviet Union in the Sino-Soviet dispute. After denouncing the Albanians and openly criticizing Peiping's support for Tirana, the Mongolians embarked on their own version of de-Stalinization by attacking Marshal Choybalsan, who ruled the Mongolian party and state from the 1930s until his death in 1952. Charging that the Choybalsan cult of personality had led to tremendously harmful consequences, Mongolian party leaders have ordered his name removed from the industrial combine in Ulan Bator and from the national university. A similar effort to follow Moscow's lead in the 1956 de-Stalinization had severe repercussions within the Mongolian party as opposing factions struggled for power.

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
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Kenya-Britain:



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
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


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
can National Union, which represents the large Kikuyu and Luo tribes, and the Kenya African Democratic Union, a coalition of smaller tribes, seem to be awaiting a decision from Colonial Secretary Maudling, which each expects will favor its position. Maudling, however, apparently still hopes to work out a negotiated settlement and wants to avoid having to impose a constitution. British officials in both London and Nairobi expect violence from dissatisfied tribal elements if the next constitutional step has to be imposed.



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Brazil-Czechoslovakia: Recent Czech activities in Recife, the principal city of economically depressed northeastern Brazil, may indicate that Prague is planning to open a consulate there, in line with the bloc's efforts to foster closer relations with Brazil. Ferdinand Hadek, Czech commercial attaché, is quoted in the local press as saying that Czechoslovakia wants to help the northeast with technical assistance, scholarships, credits, and machinery, and plans to set up industrial plants in all the states of the northeast. Czech technicians are constructing flour mills in three of the ten northeastern states, and several other states in northern Brazil have apparently expressed interest in Czech proposals. The US consul in Recife notes that increasing Czech exports to northeastern Brazil may persuade the Brazilian Government that a consulate is needed there. [REDACTED]

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Situation Report--Cameroon: President Ahmadou Ahidjo of the Federal Republic of Cameroon has shown considerable political skill in guiding the formation of the new Cameroon Federation. Despite his strong political position, which derives largely from his French support, his influence does not extend to the important southern areas of Cameroon, and left-wing terrorists continue active in the southwest. Discontent in the south stems from the slow pace of economic development and the virtual exclusion of its representatives from top posts within the government. [REDACTED]

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\*Guatemala: President Ydigoras faces the most serious political crisis of his four years in office. The army has taken over from the police in Guatemala City, and unless the situation in the capital is quickly stabilized the military is likely to force his resignation. The army would justify its move as necessary to prevent a takeover by those Communist-supported elements who sparked the rioting and now support the guerrilla operations in the interior. An army takeover, however, would not necessarily mean an end to the threat. The Guatemalan military has in the past shown itself unwilling to act against what it interprets to be the popular will.

The rioters in the capital on 15 March included many who were not students, and the police excesses used against the Communist-led student rioters on the previous two days have aroused a wide segment of the populace in the capital against the regime. The disturbances may become even bloodier. Ydigoras threatened publicly on 15 March to use thousands of his peasant supporters against the rioters and is reported by [redacted] to have already brought a number of peasants into the capital. [redacted]

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### Possible OAS Reactions to a Cease-fire Announcement

Although the proclamation of a cease-fire is generally expected at any moment, according to the US consul general in Algiers, the OAS has not called for any specific reaction in Algeria other than a 48-hour general strike. He comments that some spectacular raid or sabotage will probably be undertaken, although there is no evidence that the OAS is prepared to abandon its guerrilla and psychological tactics in favor of an overt assault which would expose it to destruction by the French Army and security forces. Many high French officials have said they expect a cease-fire announcement to provoke greatly increased violence in Algiers and Oran for about two weeks, after which the army will gradually impose order.

Salan will declare an independent Algerian government following a cease-fire. The OAS has taken some pains to create the impression that it is already functioning as a government, by issuing mobilization orders, requiring "visas" for exit and entry to Algeria, printing its own currency, and otherwise exercising administrative powers.

The bulk of the Europeans, especially in Algiers and Oran, would probably be willing to make some demonstration of hostility more violent than a general strike. The consul feels, however, that an emotional outburst may be inhibited by the slow approach of a cease-fire, which has given many Europeans time to become accustomed to the idea, and by the massive presence of French Army forces and the threat of Moslem retaliation.

In France itself, the government has taken extraordinary measures to control any internal disturbances that might follow a cease-fire announcement. All army officers have been placed on an alert status, and troops may not leave quarters except for official purposes. The US Army attaché considers that these measures are largely psychological, and that there is little likelihood of a successful OAS or military move against the government. The French minister of the interior, however, expects

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[redacted] some disorder, and reportedly has information indicating that the OAS plans to explode 150 plastic bombs in the Paris area the day a cease-fire is announced, and that Salan has ordered acts of violence--including assassination--so extreme that some OAS members are said to be reluctant to carry them out. [redacted]

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Situation Report: Cameroon

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The most dangerous threat to Ahidjo is the Communist-supported terrorist wing of the Union of Cameroun Peoples (UPC). This terrorist group began its campaign in 1954 to reunify the Cameroons and obtain independence from France. Since Ahidjo became prime minister in 1958 the UPC has concentrated on trying to unseat him. Many qualified observers expected widespread terrorism at the time of federation, 1 October 1961. Its failure to occur probably was the result of a tactical decision to delay, rather than a lack of capabilities. UPC terrorists are estimated to number 1,000 to 3,000. Most of the terrorists' arms are of crude local manufacture, but some Soviet bloc weapons have been seized by the government, and last year several UPC terrorists were captured following their return from a 10-week course in guerilla warfare and sabotage in Communist China. UPC leaders "in exile" are located in Ghana and Guinea.

Even without strong bloc support the terrorists have been able to compel the government to divert scarce resources to its armed forces. About 30 percent of the ordinary budget goes to maintain security. Despite French aid, amounting to \$40-50,000,000 annually in recent years, economic development projects have proceeded very slowly, largely because of security costs and high government operating expenses. The expenses of the new federal structure will produce even larger budget deficits, at a time when Cameroon's exports of cocoa, coffee, and bananas face increasing competition in world markets. There is considerable and persistent grumbling and criticism of Ahidjo, particularly among the younger educated Cameroonians, over the slow pace of economic development.

Ahidjo has a satisfactory working relationship with his main potential political rival on the federal level, Prime Minister John Ngu Foncha of West Cameroon, the smaller component of the federation, and Ahidjo's party, the Union Camerounaise (UC), is in firm control in East Cameroon. However, Ahidjo's almost exclusive basing of his party and regime on the more backward, conservative Moslem northern area and his moves to eliminate all opposition seem certain to cause him serious political trouble in the future.

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